ﺘﺤﺩﺕ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺘﺏ ﻭﺍﻟﺒﺎﺤﺙ
ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺭﻭﻑ "ﻜﺭﻴﺴﺘﻭﻓﺭ ﺩﻴﻔﻴﺩﺴﻭﻥ" (ﺃﺴﺘﺎﺫ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﻴﺦ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﻠﻭﻡ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﺔ
ﻓﻲ ﺠﺎﻤﻌﺔ " "ﺩﻭﺭﻫﺎﻡ" ﺍﻟﺒﺭﻴﻁﺎﻨﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺨﺒﻴﺭ
ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﺎﺭﻴﺨﻲ ﻭﺍﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻱ ﺒﺸﺅﻭﻥ ﺩﻭل ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺒﻲ) ﻓﻲ ﻤﻘﺎل ﻟﻪ ﻨﺸﺭﺘﻪ ﺃﻤﺱ ﻤﺠﻠﺔ
"ﻓﻭﺭﻴﻥ ﺒﻭﻟﻴﺴﻲ" ﺍﻷﻤﺭﻴﻜﻴﺔ ﺒﻌﻨﻭﺍﻥ:
"ﻨﻌﻡ ﻤﻠﻭﻙ ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻓﻲ ﻭﺭﻁﺔ" ﻋﻥ ﺍﻫﺘﺯﺍﺯ ﻋﺭﻭﺵ ﻤﻠﻭﻙ ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻭﺃﻤﺭﺍﺌﻬﺎ ﺭﻏﻡ ﺃﻨﻬﺎ
ﺘﺒﺩﻭ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻅﺎﻫﺭ ﻤﺴﺘﻘﺭﺓ.
ﻭﻜﺘﺏ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺸﺄﻥ
ﻴﻘﻭل: "ﻟﻠﻭﻫﻠﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻰ ﺘﺒﺩﻭ ﻤﻤﺎﻟﻙ ﻭﺇﻤﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻤﺴﺘﻘﺭﺓ، ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻷﻗل ﺒﺎﻟﻤﻘﺎﺭﻨﺔ ﻤﻊ
ﺍﻟﻤﻨﻁﻘﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﺴﻊ. ﻭﻟﻜﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﺍﻗﻊ، ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﻬﻴﺎﻜل
ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺴﺘﻨﺩ ﺇﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﻭل ﺍﻻﺴﺘﺒﺩﺍﺩﻴﺔ ﺘﺘﻌﺭﺽ ﻟﻀﻐﻭﻁ ﻤﺘﺯﺍﻴﺩﺓ، ﻜﻤﺎ
ﺘﻔﺭﺽ ﻓﺌﺎﺕ ﻭﺍﺴﻌﺔ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻭﺍﻁﻨﻴﻥ ﺘﺤﺩﻴﺎﺕ
ﻻ ﻴﻤﻜﻥ ﺘﺼﻭﺭﻫﺎ ﺤﺘﻰ ﺍﻵﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻨﺨﺏ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻜﻤﺔ".
ﻭﻴﺭﻯ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺘﺏ ﺃﻥ
ﺍﻟﻤﻤﺎﻟﻙ ﻭﺍﻹﻤﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺴﺕ (ﺍﻟﻤﻤﻠﻜﺔ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺒﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﻌﻭﺩﻴﺔ، ﻭﺍﻹﻤﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺒﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺤﺩﺓ، ﺍﻟﻜﻭﻴﺕ،
ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺭﻴﻥ، ﻗﻁﺭ، ﻭﺴﻠﻁﻨﺔ ﻋﻤﺎﻥ) ﺘﺼﺩﺕ ﻟﻠﻌﺩﻴﺩ
ﻤﻥ ﺤﺭﻜﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﺭﻀﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻤﺭ ﺍﻟﺴﻨﻴﻥ. ﻭﻟﻡ ﻴﻜﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺴﻡ ﺍﻷﻜﺒﺭ ﻤﻨﻬﺎ (ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺤﺭﻜﺎﺕ)
ﻴﺴﺘﻨﺩ ﻟﻘﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ ﻋﺭﻴﻀﺔ، ﻭﻻ ﻴﻤﺜﻠﻭﻥ
ﺇﻻ ﺃﻋﺩﺍﺩﺍ ﻤﺤﺩﻭﺩﺓ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺴﻜﺎﻥ ﺍﻷﺼﻠﻴﻴﻥ ﻭﻋﻼﻭﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻙ،
ﻴﻘﻭل ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺘﺏ، ﻭﺒﺎﻟﻨﻅﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻤﺨﺘﻠﻑ ﺍﻹﺴﺘﺭﺍﺘﻴﺠﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﺍﺨﻠﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺨﺎﺭﺠﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻤﺴﻙ ﺒﺎﻟﺤﻜﻡ -ﺒﻤﺎ
ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺘﻭﺯﻴﻊ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﻡ ﺍﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻴﺔ ﻭﺘﺭﺍﻜﻡ
ﺍﻟﻘﻭﺓ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﻋﻤﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺭﺝ- ﻓﺈﻥ ﻤﻤﺎﻟﻙ ﻭﺇﻤﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻜﺎﻨﻭﺍ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻐﺎﻟﺏ ﻓﻲ ﻭﻀﻊ ﻗﻭﻱ ﻭﻭﺍﺜﻘﻴﻥ
ﻤﻥ ﺍﺴﺘﻤﺭﺍﺭ ﺤﻜﻤﻬﻡ ﻭﻓﻲ ﻤﺄﻤﻥ ﻤﻥ ﺃﻱ
ﺘﻬﺩﻴﺩ ﻤﺤﻠﻲ، ﻜﻤﺎ ﺇﻨﻬﻡ ﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﻤﺎ ﻜﺎﻨﻭﺍ ﻗﺎﺩﺭﻴﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﺴﺘﺭﻀﺎﺀ ﺃﻭ ﺘﻬﻤﻴﺵ ﺃﻱ ﻤﻌﺎﺭﻀﺔ ﻗﺒل ﺃﻥ
ﻴﺘﻭﺴﻊ ﺘﺄﺜﻴﺭﻫﺎ ﺍﻟﺸﻌﺒﻲ.
ﻭﺘﻤﻜﻨﻭﺍ، ﻓﻲ ﻤﻌﻅﻡ
ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻻﺕ، ﻴﻀﻴﻑ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺘﺏ، ﻤﻥ ﺘﺸﻭﻴﻪ ﺼﻭﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﺭﻀﻴﻥ، ﺇﻤﺎ ﺒﺎﺘﻬﺎﻤﻬﻡ ﺒﺄﻨﻬﻡ ﻤﺩﻋﻭﻤﻭﻥ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺭﺝ
(ﺍﻟﻁﺎﺒﻭﺭ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﻤﺱ) ﺃﻭ ﺤﺘﻰ ﺒﺄﻨﻬﻡ ﺇﺭﻫﺎﺒﻴﻭﻥ.
ﻭﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎﺕ
ﺴﻤﺤﺕ ﻟﻬﺅﻻﺀ ﺍﻟﺤﻜﺎﻡ ﻭﺤﻜﻭﻤﺎﺘﻬﻡ ﺒﺘﺼﻭﻴﺭ ﺃﻨﻔﺴﻬﻡ ﻟﻐﺎﻟﺒﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﻭﺍﻁﻨﻴﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺭﺍﻗﺒﻴﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﻭﻟﻴﻴﻥ
ﺒﺄﻨﻬﻡ ﺍﻷﻜﺜﺭ ﻀﻤﺎﻨﺎ ﻭﺃﻤﺎﻨﺎ ﻭﻴﻤﻜﻥ ﺍﻻﻋﺘﻤﺎﺩ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ، ﻭﺃﻨﻬﻡ ﺃﻓﻀل ﻤﻥ ﺃﻱ ﺒﺩﺍﺌل ﺨﻁﺭﺓ ﻭﻏﻴﺭ ﻤﺘﻭﻗﻌﺔ، ﺤﺴﺒﻤﺎ
ﺃﻓﺎﺩ ﺒﻪ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺘﺏ.
ﻭﻟﻜﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻵﻭﻨﺔ
ﺍﻷﺨﻴﺭﺓ، ﺃﺜﺒﺘﺕ ﺤﺭﻜﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﺭﻀﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻴﺔ ﺃﻨﻬﺎ ﻋﺼﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻻﺤﺘﻭﺍﺀ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺏ.
ﻭﻨﺘﻴﺠﺔ ﻟﺘﻀﺎﻓﺭ
ﺍﻟﻀﻐﻭﻁ ﺍﻟﺩﺍﺨﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺘﺼﺎﻋﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﻭﺍﺠﻬﻬﺎ ﺩﻭل ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ (ﺒﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻙ ﺍﻨﺨﻔﺎﺽ ﺍﻟﻤﻭﺍﺭﺩ، ﺍﺭﺘﻔﺎﻉ
ﻤﻌﺩﻻﺕ ﺍﻟﺒﻁﺎﻟﺔ) ﻤﻊ ﻅﻬﻭﺭ ﻗﻭﻯ "ﻋﺼﺭﻴﺔ" ﺠﺩﻴﺩﺓ (ﺒﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻙ ﻭﺴﺎﺌل ﺍﻹﻋﻼﻡ ﺍﻻﺠﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻬﻭﺍﺘﻑ
ﺍﻟﺫﻜﻴﺔ)، ﻓﺈﻥ ﻫﺫﺍ ﻤﻜﻥ ﺃﻋﺩﺍﺩﺍ ﻤﺘﺯﺍﻴﺩﺓ ﻤﻥ ﻤﻭﺍﻁﻨﻲ ﺩﻭل ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﺴﻠﺢ ﺒﺎﻟﺠﺭﺃﺓ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﻓﻴﺔ
ﻟﻼﺤﺘﺠﺎﺝ ﻭﺍﻨﺘﻘﺎﺩ ﺤﻜﺎﻤﻬﻡ ﻋﻠﻨﺎ، ﻜﻤﺎ ﻴﺭﻯ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺘﺏ.
ﻭﻤﻨﺫ 2011، ﻭﺒﺩﺍﻓﻊ
ﻭﺘﺸﺠﻴﻊ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺜﻭﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺒﻼﺩ ﺃﺨﺭﻯ، ﺃﻅﻬﺭ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﺭﻀﻭﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻗﺩﺭﺓ ﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﺴﻠﻤﻴﺔ
ﻋﻠﻰ ﻓﺭﺽ ﺃﺨﻁﺭ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﺩﻴﺎﺕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻷﺴﺭ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻜﻤﺔ.
ﻭﻴﻘﻭل ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺘﺏ ﺇﻥ
ﺜﻭﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺭﺒﻴﻊ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺒﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺘﻭﻨﺱ ﻭﻤﺼﺭ ﻭﻟﻴﺒﻴﺎ ﻭﺍﻟﻴﻤﻥ ﻭﺴﻭﺭﻴﺎ ﻟﻡ ﺘﻤﻨﺢ ﺍﻷﻤل ﻟﻠﻀﻐﻁ ﺍﻟﺸﻌﺒﻲ
ﺍﻟﻤﺘﻨﺎﻤﻲ ﻟﺘﺒﻨﻲ ﻤﻁﺎﻟﺏ ﺍﻹﺼﻼﺡ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻲ ﺍﻟﺤﻘﻴﻘﻲ ﻭﻓﻘﻁ،، ﻭﻟﻜﻨﻬﺎ ﺃﻴﻀﺎ ﺠﻌﻠﺕ ﻤﻥﺍﻟﺼﻌﺏ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺩﻭل
ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﺘﺸﻭﻴﻪ ﻤﻌﺎﺭﻀﻴﻬﻡ ﻜﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺒﻕ، ﺤﻴﺙ ﺇﻥ ﻫﺅﻻﺀ ﺍﻟﻀﺎﻏﻁﻴﻥ ﻟﻴﺴﻭﺍ ﺇﻻ ﻨﺎﺸﻁﻴﻥ ﻤﺅﻴﺩﻴﻥ
ﻟﻠﺩﻴﻤﻘﺭﺍﻁﻴﺔ ﺃﻭ ﻤﻭﺍﻁﻨﻴﻥ ﻤﺤﺒﻁﻴﻥ ﺃﺩﺭﻜﻭﺍ ﺍﻻﻨﻬﻴﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺤﺘﻤﻲ ﻟﻠﻬﻴﺎﻜل ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎﺩﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ
ﺘﻘﻭﻡ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺴﻠﻁﺔ ﺤﻜﺎﻤﻬﻡ.
ﻭﻫﺫﺍ ﻻ ﻴﻌﻨﻲ، ﻜﻤﺎ
ﻴﻀﻴﻑ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺘﺏ، ﺃﻥ ﺍﻷﻨﻅﻤﺔ ﺘﺨﻠﺕ ﻋﻥ ﺘﻁﺒﻴﻕ ﺇﺴﺘﺭﺍﺘﻴﺠﻴﺎﺘﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻘﺩﻴﻤﺔ، ﻭﻟﻜﻥ ﻤﺎ ﺤﺼل ﻫﻭ ﺃﻥ ﺍﻻﺩﻋﺎﺀﺍﺕ
ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻬﻡ ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺒﻘﺔ ﻤﺎ ﻋﺎﺩ ﻴﺩﻗﻬﺎ ﺍﻷﻜﺜﺭﻭﻥ ﻤﻥ ﻤﺜل: ﺇﻴﺭﺍﻥ ﻭﺍﻹﺨﻭﺍﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﻭﺍﻁﺅ ﺍﻷﺠﻨﺒﻲ.
ﻭﻋﻼﻭﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺫﻟﻙ،
ﻜﻤﺎ ﻴﺭﻯ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺘﺏ، ﻓﺈﻥ ﺜﻭﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺭﺒﻴﻊ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺒﻲ ﺴﺎﻋﺩﺕ ﺃﻴﻀﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻓﻀﺢ ﺍﻟﺩﻋﻡ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻱ ﻟﺤﻜﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ
ﻟﻠﺩﻭل ﺍﻻﺴﺘﺒﺩﺍﺩﻴﺔ ﺍﻷﺨﺭﻯ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﻁﻘﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺨﻭﻑ ﻤﻥ ﻭﺠﻭﺩ ﺩﻴﻤﻘﺭﺍﻁﻴﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺒﻼﺩ ﺍﻟﺜﻭﺭﺍﺕ ﻭﺤﻜﻭﻤﺎﺕ
ﻤﻨﺘﺨﺒﺔ، ﺤﻴﺙ ﻜﺎﻨﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﻭﺍﻗﻑ ﺍﻷﻭﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﻤﻌﻅﻡ ﺩﻭل ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻤﻌﺎﺩﻴﺔ ﺒﺸﻜل ﻤﻠﺤﻭﻅ ﻟﻠﺭﺒﻴﻊ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺒﻲ،
ﻭﻫﺫﺍ ﻜﺎﻥ ﻟﻪ ﺃﺜﺭ ﻜﺒﻴﺭ ﻓﻲ ﻨﺯﻉ ﺍﻟﺸﺭﻋﻴﺔ ﻋﻥ ﺍﻷﺴﺭ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻜﻤﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺤﻜﻭﻤﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻨﻴﺔ.
ﻭﻤﻊ ﺘﺼﺎﻋﺩ ﺍﻟﻀﻐﻁ
ﻭﺘﻨﺎﻤﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﻋﻲ ﺍﻟﺸﻌﺒﻲ، ﻜﺎﻥ ﺭﺩ ﺃﻜﺜﺭ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻷﻨﻅﻤﺔ ﺒﻤﺯﻴﺩ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻤﻊ ﺃﻜﺜﺭ ﻤﻥ ﺃﻱ ﻭﻗﺕ ﻤﻀﻰ، ﻭﺒﺎﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ
ﻨﺯﻉ ﻤﺯﻴﺩ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﺸﺭﻋﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻷﺴﺭ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻜﻤﺔ.
ﻭﺤﺘﻰ ﺍﻵﻥ، ﻴﻤﻜﻥ
ﺍﺴﺘﺜﻨﺎﺀ ﻗﻁﺭ، ﺤﻴﺙ ﺘﻤﻜﻨﺕ ﺤﻘﺎ ﻤﻥ ﺘﻔﺎﺩﻱ ﻤﺜل ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻘﻤﻊ ﺍﻟﻭﺤﺸﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﻘﺎﺴﻲ، ﺤﺴﺏ ﺭﺃﻱ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺘﺏ،
ﻭﻫﺫﺍ ﺭﺍﺠﻊ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻅﺭﻭﻓﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻤﻭﺍﺘﻴﺔ ﻭﻤﻭﻗﻔﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻑ ﻨﻭﻋﺎ ﻤﺎ ﻤﻥ ﺜﻭﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺭﺒﻴﻊ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺒﻲ، ﻭﻤﻊ ﺫﻟﻙ،
ﻓﺤﺘﻰ ﺍﻷﺴﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻜﻤﺔ ﻫﻨﺎﻙ ﺘﺘﻌﺭﺽ ﻻﻨﺘﻘﺎﺩﺍﺕ، ﻭﻫﻨﺎﻙ ﺒﺎﻟﻔﻌل ﻤﺅﺸﺭﺍﺕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻭﺠﻭﺩ ﺍﻨﻘﺴﺎﻤﺎﺕ ﺩﺍﺨﻠﻴﺔ.
ﻭﻤﻊ ﺍﺴﺘﻤﺭﺍﺭ ﻫﺫﺍ
ﺍﻟﻭﻀﻊ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﺼﺎﻋﺩ، ﻴﺒﺩﻭ ﺃﻥ ﻤﻤﺎﻟﻙ ﻭﺇﻤﺎﺭﺍﺕ ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﺘﻡ ﺍﺴﺘﻌﺩﺍﺩ ﻟﻠﻤﻀﻲ ﻗﺩﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻘﻤﻊ
ﻭﺍﻟﺭﻗﺎﺒﺔ، ﺤﺴﺒﻤﺎ ﻴﺭﻯ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺘﺏ، ﻟﻘﺩ ﺯﺭﻋﻭﺍ ﺍﻟﺸﺭﻁﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻜل ﻤﻜﺎﻥ ﻭﻓﺭﻀﻭﺍ ﺃﺠﻬﺯﺓ؛
ﻭﺠﻠﺒﻭﺍ ﺠﻨﻭﺩﺍ ﺃﺠﺎﻨﺏ،
ﻜﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺃﺒﻭﻅﺒﻲ ﻤﻥ ﺃﻤﺎﻜﻥ ﺒﻌﻴﺩﺓ ﻤﺜل ﻜﻭﻟﻭﻤﺒﻴﺎ ﻭﺠﻨﻭﺏ ﺃﻓﺭﻴﻘﻴﺎ، ﻭﺃﻏﻠﻘﺕ ﺘﻘﺭﻴﺒﺎ ﺠﻤﻴﻊ
ﻤﻨﻅﻤﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﻨﻲ ﺍﻟﺤﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ.
ﻭﺒﺎﻋﺘﻤﺎﺩﻫﻡ، ﻜﻤﺎ
ﻴﺸﻴﺭ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺘﺏ، ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺼﻤﺕ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻟﻼﻤﺒﺎﻻﺓ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻯ ﺍﻟﻌﻅﻤﻰ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺘﺤﻤﻴﻬﻡ ﻤﻘﺎﺒل ﻀﻤﺎﻥ ﺍﻻﺴﺘﻘﺭﺍﺭ
ﺍﻹﻗﻠﻴﻤﻲ، ﻴﺴﺘﻌﺩ ﺤﻜﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻟﻤﻭﺍﺠﻬﺔ ﺍﻟﺭﺒﻴﻊ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺒﻲ ﻭﺠﻬﺎ ﻟﻭﺠﻪ.
ﻭﻴﺭﻯ ﺍﻟﻜﺎﺘﺏ ﺃﻥ
ﻜل ﺍﻻﻓﺘﺭﺍﻀﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺜﻼﺙ ﺍﻷﺴﺎﺴﻴﺔ ﺤﻭل ﺍﺴﺘﻘﺭﺍﺭ ﺤﻜﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﻤﺎﻟﻙ، ﺘﺒﺩﻭ ﺒﺸﻜل ﺭﺍﺴﺦ ﻭﺩﺍﺌﻡ ﺃﻨﻬﺎ ﻏﻴﺭ
ﺼﺤﻴﺤﺔ، ﻭﻫﻲ: (1) ﻫﻨﺎﻙ ﻤﺎ ﻴﻜﻔﻲ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻭﺍﺭﺩ ﻟﻠﺤﻜﻭﻤﺎﺕ ﻟﻠﺤﻔﺎﻅ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺘﻭﺯﻴﻊ ﺍﻟﺜﺭﻭﺓﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻤﻭﺍﻁﻨﻴﻥ
ﻓﻲ ﻤﻘﺎﺒل ﺍﻹﺫﻋﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﻲ؛ (2) ﺍﻟﺠﺯﺀ ﺍﻷﻜﺒﺭ ﻤﻥ ﻤﻭﺍﻁﻨﻲ ﺍﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻏﻴﺭ ﻤﻬﺘﻤﻴﻥ ﺒﺎﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﺔ ﺃﻭ
ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺒﻠﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ ﺍﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻷﺼﻠﻲ ﻟﻠﺤﻜﻡ؛ (3) ﻭﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﺤﻜﺎﻡ ﺃﻨﻔﺴﻬﻡ ﻤﺴﺎﻟﻤﻭﻥ، ﻭﺭﻋﻭﻥ ﻭﻤﺩﺭﻜﻭﻥ
ﺠﻴﺩﺍ ﻟﻠﻭﻀﻊ.
Yes,
the Gulf monarchs are in trouble
Posted
By Christopher M. Davidson Tuesday,
November 13, 2012 - 3:14 PM Share
At
first glance the Gulf monarchies look stable, at least compared to the broader
region. In reality, however, the political and economic structures that
underpin these highly autocratic states are coming under increasing pressure,
and broad swathes of citizens are making hitherto unimaginable challenges to
the ruling elites.
These
six monarchies -- Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman -- have faced down a number of different opposition
movements over the years. However, for the most part, these movements have not
been broad-based and have tended to represent only narrow sections of the
indigenous populations. Moreover, given their various internal and external
survival strategies -- including distributive economic systems and overseas
soft power accumulation -- the incumbent regimes have generally been in strong,
confident positions, and have usually been able to placate or sideline any
opposition before it could gain too much traction. In most cases the Gulf monarchies
have also been very effective at demonizing opponents, either branding them as
foreign-backed fifth columns, as religious fundamentalists, or even as
terrorists. In turn this has allowed rulers and their governments to portray
themselves to the majority of citizens and most international observers as
safe, reliable upholders of the status quo, and thus far preferable to any
dangerous and unpredictable alternatives. Significantly, when modernizing
forces have begun to impact their populations -- often improving communications
between citizens or their access to education -- the Gulf monarchies have been
effective at co-option, often bringing such forces under the umbrella of the
state or members of ruling families, and thus managing to apply a mosaic model
of traditional loyalties alongside modernization even in the first few years of
the 21st century.
More
recently, however, powerful opposition movements have emerged that have proved
less easy to contain.
As a
combined result of mounting internal pressures faced by the Gulf monarchies
(including declining resources, rising unemployment, and embattled subsidies)
and the emergence of new modernizing forces which have proved harder for their
governments to co-opt (including social media, satellite television, and smart
phones), an increasing number of Gulf nationals have become emboldened enough
to protest against and openly criticize their rulers. Since 2011, clearly
spurred on by developments elsewhere in the region, these opponents have been
able to present the most serious challenges yet to the various ruling families.
In something of a perfect storm for the incumbent regimes, the Arab Spring
revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria have not only given hope
for those Gulf nationals and Gulf-based movements committed to serious
political reform and unseating the current autocracies, but they have also made
it harder for the Gulf monarchies to depict their new enemies as anything other
than pro-democracy activists or disillusioned citizens who have recognized the
inevitable collapse of the political and economic structures underpinning their
rulers. That's not to say that the regimes do not still apply old strategies,
it's just that the resulting claims are now a little less believable: Iran-backed
Shiites in Bahrain, Egypt-backed Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, a British coup
underway in the UAE with local allies, etc.
Furthermore,
the Arab Spring revolutions -- or at least the first few waves of protest in
Tunisia and Egypt -- have also helped expose the Gulf monarchies' strong
preference for supporting other authoritarian states in the region and their
fear of having democratic, representative governments take shape in neighboring
states. Certainly the initial responses of most of the Gulf monarchies were
markedly anti-Arab Spring. This has had a massive delegitimizing effect on the
ruling families and governments involved, as in the eyes of many citizens they
have positioned themselves as a distinct and anachronistic
counter-revolutionary bloc.
Unsurprisingly
the new, post-2011 opposition in the Gulf monarchies has manifested in
different ways depending on the individual circumstances and pressures in each
state. This has ranged from full-blown street riots complete with killings and
martyrs in the poorer Gulf monarchies to more subtle intellectual and even
Internet-led "cyber opposition" in the wealthier Gulf monarchies. But
in all cases the regimes have had to respond with more repression than ever
before, thus further delegitimizing the ruling families. In some instances the
monarchies have instituted brutal police crackdowns or have deployed foreign
mercenaries while in others they have taken political prisoners, manipulated
judicial systems, and further stymied civil society. They have invoked the
Koran to justify bans on protests and underpin instructions to citizens to obey
their masters. Thus far only Qatar has really managed to avoid such
heavy-handedness, mostly due to its more favorable circumstances and its rather
different stance on the Arab Spring. Nevertheless even its ruling family is not
without critics, and there are already indications of significant internal
discord.
As the
situation continues to escalate, the Gulf monarchies seem firmly set to push
ahead with repression and censorship. They have put in place sophisticated
police states and censorship systems; brought in foreign soldiers -- in Abu Dhabi's case from as far afield as
Columbia and South Africa; and closed down almost all genuine civil society
organizations. Banking on international silence or indifference from superpower
protectors in the face of human rights abuses in return for guaranteeing
regional stability, the rulers are preparing to tackle the Arab Spring head-on,
with probably no stones left unturned.
All
three of the core assumptions about monarchical stability in the region are
thus now firmly and permanently exposed as being untrue: that there are enough
resources for governments to keep distributing wealth to their citizens in
exchange for political acquiescence; that the bulk of Gulf citizens are
apolitical or view the tribal system as the only authentic system of
governance; and that the rulers themselves are pious, peaceful, and generally
well meaning. The reality, of course, is that there are now large numbers of
involuntarily unemployed Gulf nationals, large pockets of poverty, and
declining resources in economies that have largely failed to diversify away
from hydrocarbon exports. Moreover, there is now clearly a modern,
well-connected, and increasingly well-educated population of younger citizens
who are no longer willing to live by the old rules, are openly expressing their
contempt with the status quo, and -- in many cases -- express solidarity with
Arab Spring movements elsewhere in the region. Finally, and most importantly,
the vicious crackdowns and arbitrary detentions that have been taking place as
regimes have sought to silence these voices are tragic, but are nonetheless
helping to dispel the illusion that these unelected, unaccountable rulers have
anything in common with the tribal, benevolent rulers of the pre-oil era.
Christopher
M. Davidson is a reader in Middle East politics in the School of Government and
International Affairs at Durham University and author of After the Sheikhs: The
Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies. This piece is a contribution to a three
part MEC symposium on the resilience of Arab monarchy.
